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Abstract: The end of World War II prompted a series of changes in international 
relations. Turkish-American relations were heavily impacted by the end of the war, and 
geopolitical factors influenced the development of Turkish-American relations. This 
paper seeks to demonstrate that the development of Turkish-American relations directly 
responded to the Soviet Union and Turkish-Soviet tensions.  
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 Prior to World War II, neither Turkey nor the US prioritized Turkish-American 
relations. As the war came to an end, the US and Turkey began to collaborate on a deeper 
level, and within a decade, became key allies for one another. While much of the 
collaboration can be attributed to the Cold War climate and the bipolar world order that 
arose, Turkish-American relations strengthened due to several reasons, pressure from the 
Soviet Union merely being one. This paper seeks to explore the development of Turkish-
American relations from the end of World War II to Turkey’s accession into NATO in 
1952 in order to determine when and how the two states developed such a close alliance 
without possessing a shared history.  
 This paper primarily utilizes diplomatic documents from the United States 
Department of State in addition to Turkish and American works that chronicle the early 
years of Turkish-American relations. The diplomatic documents from the Department of 
State form the bulk of the scholarship for this paper because, in addition to showing 
thorough documentation of conversations and meetings throughout this period, they also 
provide a glimpse into other actors’ roles in the development of Turkish-American 
relations. Existing scholarship on this topic does not delve into the political dynamics that 
impacted the US, Turkey, and the USSR. This paper seeks to add the role of the USSR 
into conversations about Turkish-American relations.   
Divided into three chapters, it considers the development of Turkish-American 
relations chronologically. Chapter One covers the end of World War II and its aftermath, 
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examining how the US and Turkey initially began their alliance. Chapter Two examines 
the start of large amounts of American economic and military aid provided to Turkey and 
questions why the United States viewed Turkey as a financial priority. Chapter Three 
traces Turkey’s road to NATO membership, considering Turkey’s participation in the 
Korean War and other NATO members’ reluctance to admit Turkey into the 
organization.   
 Existing works on this topic tend to merely recount events that shaped the 
development of Turkish-American relations without fully explaining why particular 
events were important or how they shaped the Turkish-American relationship during the 
Cold War. Because Turkey, even during World War II, had a large population and plenty 
of natural resources, it hypothetically could have pursued a policy of neutrality when the 
Cold War began, as other states, such as India chose to do. However, this paper seeks to 
examine why Soviet pressure on Turkey made an alliance with the United States 
increasingly appealing. When considering the influence the Soviet Union exerted over 
Turkey in the Cold War years, it becomes clearer that Turkish-American relations 
developed out of Turkey’s disdain toward the Soviet Union rather than merely admiration 







Chapter One: Turkey’s Position in a New World Order 
Prior to World War II, the US and Turkey had little diplomatic interest in one 
another. While they did have diplomatic relations, neither party considered this 
relationship to be particularly important. As WWII came to an end, however, this 
relationship began to shift. 1945-46 laid the groundwork for burgeoning Turkish-
American relations, with greater economic involvement and diplomatic interactions. 
Throughout these two years, this relationship altered from being casually diplomatic to 
preempting the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. As this transition did not happen 
overnight, examining these years sheds light on how this transition developed.  
This chapter addresses a range of factors that influenced the development of 
Turkish-American relations. These factors include financial relations, geopolitical 
relations, and international agreements as they pertain to the US, Turkey, and other 
influential states, such as the UK and USSR. Additionally, this chapter includes Turkish 
and American speculation about the Soviet Union and its intentions in order to capture 
the mindset the diplomats were operating in. This chapter seeks to provide a foundation 




At the beginning of 1945, the United States and Turkey sought to collaborate on a 
mutual aid agreement as a continuation of the Lend-Lease agreement of 1941.1 Because 
of the high cost of maintaining a large standing army, Turkey lacked the funds to 
purchase adequate amounts of vehicular equipment, including trucks and tires, in order to 
continue its industrial and agricultural development. However, hesitancies on the Turkish 
side extended the length of the negotiation process to determine the terms of a mutual aid 
agreement. At this point in time, Turkish-American relations dealt primarily with 
economic aid. However, in the early 1940s, the United Kingdom played a larger role in 
providing Turkey with economic aid and the British and the Turks viewed the Anglo-
Turkish alliance as a much stronger relationship than the Turkish-American relationship.  
In the initial days of Turkey’s participation in the Lend-Lease program, some 
American goods were delivered to Turkey by the British. The Lend-Lease program 
allowed the US to provide goods and materials to other countries, including Turkey, at a 
favorable rate. Turkey had a serious concern about whether it would be charged twice, 
once by each country, for these goods since they were delivered by the British but had an 
American origin. As a result, Turkey remained hesitant to sign any agreement with the 
United States unless the agreement explicitly included language to ensure that Turkey did 
not pay twice for the goods it received under the Lend-Lease program.2 Fearful that 
                                                     
1 Foreign Relations of the United States,: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, The Near East and Africa, Volume 
VIII, eds. E. Ralph Perkins and S. Everett Gleason (Washington: United States Government Printing 
Office, 1969), Document 1265. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945v08/d1265 
2 Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, The Near East and Africa, Volume 
VIII, eds. E. Ralph Perkins and S. Everett Gleason (Washington: United States Government Printing 
Office, 1969), Document 1268. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945v08/d1268 
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communication with the British could cause the Turks to refrain from signing the pending 
agreement, the United States took the liberty of assuring the Turkish government that not 
only would it not be double charged for goods, but that the US had access to all of the 
records of shipments received by Turkey during the Lend-Lease program3. Additionally, 
the US had records of the Turkish Embassy in Washington signing off on all of the 
shipments.4 This mutual aid agreement was intended to provide an avenue for Americans 
to provide aid to Turkey, as the initial Lend-Lease agreement of 1941 had been 
suspended during the war when Turkey signed a neutrality and nonaggression pact with 
Germany in 1943.5 As the war continued, a new mutual aid and assistance agreement 
provided the US and Turkey with the opportunity to strengthen their alliance and 
Turkey’s defense capabilities. Additionally, at the end of June 1945, the UK officially 
told Turkey that it would not make Turkey pay for Lend-Lease items that had been 
manufactured in the United States. 6 Collaboration on mutual aid helped pave the way for 
enhanced cooperation between the US and Turkey.  
 
                                                     
3 Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, The Near East and Africa, Volume 
VIII, eds. E. Ralph Perkins and S. Everett Gleason (Washington: United States Government Printing 
Office, 1969), Document 1272. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945v08/d1272 
4 Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, The Near East and Africa, Volume 
VIII, eds. E. Ralph Perkins and S. Everett Gleason (Washington: United States Government Printing 
Office, 1969), Document 1273. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945v08/d1273 
5 Fahir Armaoğlu, Belgelerle Türk-Amerikan Münasebetleri. (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 
1991), 135. 
6 Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, The Near East and Africa, Volume 
VIII, eds. E. Ralph Perkins and S. Everett Gleason (Washington: United States Government Printing 
Office, 1969), Document 1282. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945v08/d1282 
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Treaty of Friendship 
Turkish-American relations developed with both parties considering other 
prominent global actors. The Soviet Union played a significant role in initial relations 
towards the end of World War II, and Turkish-Soviet relations heavily impacted the 
direction of Turkish-American relations.  
As the US and Turkey began to strengthen their relations, the relationship 
between the Soviet Union and Turkey soured. In 1925, the Soviet Union and the Republic 
of Turkey had signed a Treaty of Friendship and Nonaggression, which was up for 
renewal in 1945.7 If neither party had done anything, the treaty would have automatically 
renewed for a two-year period. However, the Soviets sought to denounce the treaty, not 
as an act of aggression, but in hopes that the treaty could be renegotiated, culminating in 
key changes that would be more favorable to Soviet security and prestige.8 The Soviets 
reasoned that the treaty was ‘out of date and required revision.’9 The Turkish 
Government suspected that the Soviets intended to use a revision of the treaty as an 
opportunity to suggest altering the Montreux Convention, which had several components 
the Soviets found problematic. The Montreux Convention of 1936 concerned the 
Bosporus Straits. It clarified which parties were allowed to pass through the Straits during 
peace time and war time, as well as who was responsible for the maintenance and 
                                                     
7 Oral Sander, Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi 
Yayınları, 1979), 4. 
8 Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, The Near East and Africa, Volume 
VIII, eds. E. Ralph Perkins and S. Everett Gleason (Washington: United States Government Printing 
Office, 1969), Document 1185. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945v08/d1185 
9 Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, The Near East and Africa, Volume 
VIII, eds. E. Ralph Perkins and S. Everett Gleason (Washington: United States Government Printing 
Office, 1969), Document 1183. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945v08/d1183 
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protection of the Straits, namely Turkey. The Soviet Union opposed the Turks having sole 
control over the Straits, which they claimed to be a serious security issue.10 As the Straits 
are the only warm water passage from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean Sea, the Soviet 
Union justifiably saw access to the Straits as a critical issue. In order to acquire greater 
access to the Straits, the Soviets began a disinformation campaign about the Turks. In 
1945, they began a ‘war of nerves’11 wherein they spread rumors, seeking to put pressure 
on the Turks. For example, they indicated there were many Soviet troops amassing on the 
Bulgarian border with Turkey, but according to Turkish and British intelligence, that was 
completely untrue.12 
 
War of Nerves/Disinformation  
Throughout early 1945, Turkey asserted that it would not be coerced by the Soviet 
war of nerves. Turkish Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Selim Sarper, communicated 
Turkey’s resistance to Soviet demands by reminding his American counterparts that 
Turkey had firmly rejected Russian and German demands in 1939 and had no reason to 
                                                     
10 Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, The Near East and Africa, Volume 
VIII, eds. E. Ralph Perkins and S. Everett Gleason (Washington: United States Government Printing 
Office, 1969), Document 1240. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945v08/d1240 
11 Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, The Near East and Africa, Volume 
VIII, eds. E. Ralph Perkins and S. Everett Gleason (Washington: United States Government Printing 
Office, 1969), Document 1260. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945v08/d1260 
12 Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, The Near East and Africa, Volume 
VIII, eds. E. Ralph Perkins and S. Everett Gleason (Washington: United States Government Printing 
Office, 1969), Document 1188. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945v08/d1188 
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bend to Soviet demands at this time.13 In a discussion with Soviet Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Vyacheslav Molotov, Sargent reiterated that that the Montreux Convention did 
not merely concern Russia and Turkey, but other states as well. Therefore, Turkey would 
not allow Soviet bases in the Straits.14 The British asserted their belief that the Soviets 
would prefer a rupture in the Anglo-Turkish alliance and might give up other demands if 
that were to happen, although neither the British nor the Turks intended for such a rupture 
to occur. The Turks also believed that the Soviets intended to encourage a new political 
regime in Turkey in order to ‘reorient’ Turkey in the same way Romania and Bulgaria 
had been ‘reoriented.’15  
While the US did not anticipate Russian military action against Turkey, the 
Russian people were being told by their own government that the USSR might go to war 
with Turkey.16 Despite the fact that military action against Turkey was unlikely, 
American advisors viewed internal Soviet propaganda with hesitancy. They considered it 
possible that this constituted a continued effort in the ‘war of nerves’ or that the USSR 
was spreading these rumors for the benefit of its domestic population, to encourage them 
                                                     
13 Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, The Near East and Africa, Volume 
VIII, eds. E. Ralph Perkins and S. Everett Gleason (Washington: United States Government Printing 
Office, 1969), Document 1196. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945v08/d1196 
14 Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, The Near East and Africa, Volume 
VIII, eds. E. Ralph Perkins and S. Everett Gleason (Washington: United States Government Printing 
Office, 1969), Document 1198. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945v08/d1198 
15 Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, The Near East and Africa, Volume 
VIII, eds. E. Ralph Perkins and S. Everett Gleason (Washington: United States Government Printing 
Office, 1969), Document 1199. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945v08/d1199 
16 Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, The Near East and Africa, Volume 
VIII, eds. E. Ralph Perkins and S. Everett Gleason (Washington: United States Government Printing 
Office, 1969), Document 1215. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945v08/d1215 
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to continue military production. Whatever the motivation, American Charge in the Soviet 
Union, George Kennan, saw this propaganda as a cause for concern.17 
The American Ambassador in the Soviet Union, W. Averell Harriman, considered 
it likely that the Soviet Union would feel vulnerable until it maintained control of both 
Turkey and the Black Sea, and that it might try to disrupt Turkey’s Armenian and 
Kurdish populations to achieve this end.18 This was due, in part, to a lack of significant 
leftist opposition in Turkey. The likelihood of stirring discontent within Turkey was 
stronger if minority communities, rather than ideological minorities, were targeted. 
Dating back to the Ottoman Empire, both the Armenian and Kurdish communities had 
been treated differently than Turkish communities, in many ways creating large social 
disparities in the communities. Additionally, once the Republic of Turkey was founded, 
policies such as the language reform movement led to increased discrimination against 
these populations, as they were no longer allowed to use their native languages to 
communicate in any official sense. Turkish concern about Russian conspiracy in the 
Armenian population dated back to the Ottoman Empire as well, resulting in increased 
discrimination against the Armenians, including deportations and forced marches by 
entire communities of Armenians in 1915.19 Yet the Americans viewed potential Soviet 
                                                     
17 Ibid.  
18 Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, Europe, Volume V, eds. E. Ralph 
Perkins and S. Everett Gleason, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1969), Document 681. 
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945v05/d681 
19 Janet Klein, The Margins of Empire: Kurdish Militias in the Ottoman Tribal Zone (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2011). 
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success in inciting these groups as negligible.20 In part, this perspective came from lack 
of evidence that the Soviets had worked to arm these groups. Yet, the Americans 
continued to consider these particular minority communities as potential areas for Soviet 
influence because the Soviets continued to attempt to incite them.  
Additional Soviet disinformation from Soviets was identified via encounters with 
both Bulgarian and Greek diplomats. In a meeting between the Turkish Prime Minister 
İsmet İnönü and the Bulgarian Minister Antonoff, discussions about Turko-Soviet 
relations and the potential for their improvement took place. Antonoff sought to 
encourage the Turkish government to make efforts to improve its relations with the 
Soviet government, particularly because the USSR might consider creating a pact among 
the Black Sea Powers, including Greece and Turkey.21 By relaying this message through 
the Bulgarian Minister, the Soviets were able to maintain a distance from the proposal 
and gage potential Turkish interest and cooperation in the event they pursued that option. 
Additionally, the USSR approached the Greek government to relay a message to Turkey 
that the only way the Black Sea Powers could maintain safety and security would be 
through joint Soviet-Turkish control of the Straits.22 Although the Greek Ambassador 
indicated to the Soviet Ambassador that the Turkish government would assuredly reject 
                                                     
20 Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, Europe, Volume V, eds. E. Ralph 
Perkins and S. Everett Gleason, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1969), Document 681. 
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945v05/d681 
21 Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, The Near East and Africa, Volume 
VIII, eds. E. Ralph Perkins and S. Everett Gleason, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1969), 
Document 1246.  https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945v08/d1246 
22 Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, The Near East and Africa, Volume 
VIII, eds. E. Ralph Perkins and S. Everett Gleason (Washington: United States Government Printing 
Office, 1969), Document 1248. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945v08/d1248 
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such a proposal, the Soviet Ambassador responded that this position might change “under 
certain conditions,” insinuating that Turkey might change its position under enough 
Soviet pressure.23 This kind of thinly veiled threat would become more commonplace 
throughout the late 1940s as Turkey’s relationship with the US strengthened and Turkey 
continued to resist Soviet pressure and expansion. 
Towards the end of 1945, the Soviet Union began a program that directly 
impacted Turkey and its Armenian population. The USSR invited Armenians outside of 
Soviet Armenia to relocate to Soviet Armenia. The majority of applications came from 
Turkey and Iran; yet the Turkish government did not seem very concerned with this 
development.24 Ambassador Wilson speculated that Soviet intentions behind this policy 
were to overpopulate Soviet Armenia, potentially strengthening the USSR’s claims on 
Kars and Ardahan.25 Near the end of December, 1945, nearly 1500 Armenians from 
Turkey had applied to relocate to Armenia.26 Although this policy could have had severe 
implications for Turkey’s territorial sovereignty, the Turks were not heavily concerned 
about a mass exodus of Armenians. However, Georgian claims to part of Turkey’s 
territory concerned them greatly. Near the end of 1945, the Soviet press put forth a claim 
                                                     
23 Ibid.  
24 Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, The Near East and Africa, Volume 
VIII, eds. E. Ralph Perkins and S. Everett Gleason (Washington: United States Government Printing 
Office, 1969), Document 1261.https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945v08/d1261 
25 Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, The Near East and Africa, Volume 
VIII, eds. E. Ralph Perkins and S. Everett Gleason, (Washington, United States Government Printing 
Office, 1969), Document 1258.  https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945v08/d1258 
26 Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, The Near East and Africa, Volume 
VIII, eds. E. Ralph Perkins and S. Everett Gleason (Washington: United States Government Printing 
Office, 1969), Document 1261.https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945v08/d1261 
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on behalf of Soviet Georgia for the Turkish Black Sea coast.27 As this introduced yet 
another territorial claim, the Turkish government viewed this development with 
apprehension. This claim continued the Soviet war of nerves on Turkey in order to 
pressure Turkey into relinquishing sole control over the Straits.  
 
Montreux Convention 
The Montreux Convention had established rules for passage through the Dardanelles 
and allowed Turkey to remilitarize the Bosporus.28 At the Potsdam Conference of 1945, 
Stalin attempted to revise the terms of the Montreux Convention to allow free passage of 
Soviet warships at all times. He shared his reasoning by stating that Turkey “had a hand 
on Russia’s throat,” because the Turks had full control over the Straits and could close 
them at any time.29 Both Turkey and the United States were wary of Soviet requests. The 
Soviet revisions to the Montreux Convention agreed upon by the US at the Potsdam 
Conference are as follows: 
1. The Straits should always be open to the passage of merchant ships of all 
countries. 
2. The Straits should always be open to the passage of warships of the Black Sea 
Powers. 
                                                     
27 Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, The Near East and Africa, Volume 
VIII, eds. E. Ralph Perkins and S. Everett Gleason (Washington: United States Government Printing 
Office, 1969), Document 1260. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945v08/d1260 
28 Fahir Armaoğlu, Belgelerle Türk-Amerikan Münasebetleri. (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 
1991), 128-9. 
29 Armaoğlu, Belgelerle Türk-Amerikan Münasebetleri, 129. 
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3. Passage through the Straits for warships not belonging to the Black Sea Powers 
shall not be permitted except in cases specially provided for.30 
However, the US disagreed with the USSR about two crucial points: that the Straits 
should be available only to Black Sea powers and about who was responsible for the 
defense of the Straits. The US advocated for Turkey to have sole control over the 
protection of the Straits while the USSR wanted joint control.31 At Potsdam, the Three 
Powers agreed that the Montreux Convention should be revised, and that each power 
should speak with Turkey separately about terms of the revision.32 
 The United States began considering the revision of the Montreux Convention 
and sought to acquire the Turkish opinion on potential options for revision. Turkey 
responded by asserting that American interest in Turkey was waning, citing examples 
such as American refusal to work with the British about Russian demands on Turkey, and 
calling American discussions with Russia ‘friendly,’ which the Turkish government 
found to be problematic.33 The Turks interpreted the US’s failure to take a stronger 
position on Russian claims to Turkish territory as the US appeasing the Soviet Union and 
compared this appeasement to the appeasement of Hitler’s territorial demands. 
Additionally, the US advocacy for the Straits to allow “unrestricted commerce of vessels 
of all kinds” was interpreted by the Turks as allowing no way for Turkey to protect itself 
                                                     
30 Armaoğlu, Belgelerle Türk-Amerikan Münasebetleri, 133. 
31 Armaoğlu, Belgelerle Türk-Amerikan Münasebetleri, 149. 
32 Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, The Near East and Africa, Volume 
VIII, eds. E. Ralph Perkins and S. Everett Gleason, (Washington: United States Government Printing 
Office, 1969), Document 1200. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945v08/d1200 
33 Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, The Near East and Africa, Volume 
VIII, eds. E. Ralph Perkins and S. Everett Gleason, (Washington: United States Government Printing 
Office, 1969), Document 1203. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945v08/d1203 
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from Russia “sailing its entire Black Sea fleet into the Sea of Marmora at any time, 
leveling its guns at Istanbul, and presenting Turkey with demands.”34 Another concern 
for the Turks came by way of President Truman’s speech after the Potsdam Conference. 
In the speech, Truman spoke about international waterways and criticized states that used 
these waterways ‘selfishly,’ listing examples such as the Rhine, the Danube, the Kiel 
Canal, and the Straits. Due to his inclusion of the Straits with three Axis waterways, the 
Turkish Government feared that the United States did not consider Turkey to be one of its 
allies, despite the fact that Turkey had kept Hitler from accessing the Caucasus and the 
Suez Canal through use of Turkish land.35 These complaints resulted in repeated 
assurance from the American Ambassador that US policy and opinion towards Turkey 
had not changed.36 
The Soviet Union strongly opposed the idea of the internationalization of the 
Straits, and it stood to benefit more from waiting for regime change in Turkey rather than 
pressing the issue in the moment.37 The Soviets had time on their side in this issue, as 
they had a beneficial position under the Montreux Convention as it stood. If the Soviets 
could encourage a friendlier government in Turkey that would be willing to renegotiate 
the terms of the Convention as well as other bilateral issues, it would present the ideal 
scenario for the USSR. Therefore, their preferred strategy was to wait for a more 
                                                     
34 Ibid.  
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid.  
37 Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, The Near East and Africa, Volume 
VIII, eds. E. Ralph Perkins and S. Everett Gleason, (Washington: United States Government Printing 
Office, 1969), Document 1221. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945v08/d1221 
 16 
favorable moment to press the issue. However, they continued to be displeased with the 
Convention and had a strong interest in acquiring control of the Straits. 
The American position on the Convention indicated that the Straits should not be 
neutralized or demilitarized unless the US was willing to guarantee support for Turkey’s 
territorial integrity, which Secretary of State Dean Acheson believed required 
Congressional support.38 As neutralizing or demilitarizing the Straits would impair 
Turkey’s ability to defend itself, the US believed that was an unfair request unless the US 
was willing to offer a guarantee; but offering a guarantee posed a big risk to the US as 
well. Therefore, it was determined that the US would not propose neutralization or 
demilitarization of the Straits. The US also had a vested interest in keeping the USSR 
from expanding and saw this as an opportunity to act. According to the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff: 
Russia has so far succeeded in obtaining her demands because she has the 
might, if not always the right, on her side and has convinced the other 
powers that in the case of Poland, the Baltic States, Bessarabia and 
Ruthenia, she would seize by force what was not granted by her 
agreement. The current demands and proposals of Russia, however, are 
not in exactly the same category. While it is true that the United States and 
Great Britain could not successfully oppose a determined Russian effort to 
seize [the Bosporus and certain Turkish areas in northeast Turkey] by 
force, it is also true that as Russian demands progress farther afield, her 
power to seize her objectives progressively declines, and there is a 
diminishing ration of return to risk and effort…we should give full weight 
to the fact that she is war-weary, over-extended by her great efforts and in 
need of years to reestablish her economy, consolidate her gains and recoup 
                                                     
38 Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, The Near East and Africa, Volume 
VIII, eds. E. Ralph Perkins and S. Everett Gleason, (Washington: United States Government Printing 
Office, 1969), Document 1205.https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945v08/d1205 
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her losses, a process in which she requires the substantial support and 
assistance of the United States.39 
 
By mid-September, it became clear to the State Department that the UK and 
USSR intended to wait to approach Turkey until after the US approached Turkey.40 The 
US decided to submit its proposal to Turkey and notify the UK and USSR of its actions.41 
The US proposal responded to what American strategists predicted about Soviet 
intentions regarding the Straits. As air power was sufficient to keep the USSR out of the 
Straits, the US determined that was not their true objective.42 Regime change in Turkey 
would serve to grant the Soviet Union the sphere of influence and security it desired, 
making regime change its more likely objective.  
 Throughout 1945, the US placed heavy emphasis on maintaining Turkey’s 
territorial integrity and sovereignty, while not creating conflict with the Soviet Union. 
The US had strong opposition to the USSR’s claims on the Bosporus Straits, Kars, and 
Ardahan. However, at this point the US did not have a strong interest in allying with 
Turkey directly. The US found it much more productive to keep Turkey relatively neutral 
and in order to maintain American access through the Straits and in the Eastern 
Mediterranean.  
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Turkish Opinion about Tensions with USSR 
In preparation for the Three Power Conference in Moscow in 1946, the United 
States assured Turkey that the issue of the Straits was not on the agenda.43 Turkey had 
concerns about the Soviets making demands about their position regarding the Straits 
without a Turkish representative present. As the war of nerves continued against Turkey, 
Ambassadors Wilson and Erkin clarified that the Turkish government was doing what it 
could to prevent any Turkish aggression towards the USSR.44 The Turkish government 
recognized that in this scenario, aggression towards the USSR would only serve to 
escalate tensions which it sought to avoid. The Turkish Government assured the US that 
Turkey stood completely united against Soviet demands. Prime Minister Şükrü Saraçoğlu 
believed that the USSR had received misinformation from its agents inside Turkey that 
indicated Turkey might be ready to soften to Soviet demands.45 However, Saraçoğlu 
insisted this that was inaccurate and that Turkey would not cave to Soviet pressure.  
When asked what Turkey would do in the event of an attack by the USSR, Erkin 
stated, “if Turkey [was] doomed [to] disappear as [a] result [of] Soviet aggression, 
chances for rebirth [of an] independent Turkey [are] much greater if she resists and goes 
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down honorably rather than disappear as [a] result [of] attempting appeasement and 
becoming Soviet satellite.”46  
The tensions between the USSR and Turkey continued into September. The 
Turkish Government viewed the Soviet Union as posing a legitimate threat to Turkey’s 
sovereignty. In a discussion between Ambassador Wilson and Turkish Foreign Minister 
Saka in September of 1946, Saka outlined three options he believed the Soviets had 
regarding Turkey: to attack Turkey, to attempt to convene an international conference to 
revise the Montreux Convention, or do nothing for the time being and wait for a better 
opportunity to press the issue.47 Saka viewed the third option as the most likely route for 
the Soviets to take. Because of the persisting Soviet threat to Turkish sovereignty and 
security, the US worked to develop a new policy regarding Turkey and Turkish security 
throughout 1946.48 The State Department decided that in order to act most efficiently in 
Turkey, it would be necessary to consider the political, economic, and military 
considerations in Turkey that went beyond the existing memorandum from the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff. 
As tensions continued, the USSR reverted to its propaganda campaign against 
Turkey. By spreading rumors about Turkey and emphasizing its perceived failures in 
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In early 1946, due to widely held frustrations about the USSR’s aggression, the 
Turkish press vehemently attacked the Soviet Union, with offensive headlines reading 
“Machiavelism now Molotovism” and “Stalin is doing what Hitler did”, resulting in 
Soviet irritation towards the Turkish press.50 The Turkish government expressed regret 
about what the Turkish press had published, but also took the opportunity to remind 
Soviet leaders of many instances in which the Soviet press had disparaged Turkey or 
spread false information regarding Turkey.51 This did not alleviate tensions between the 
two states. 
The Turkish press continued to attack the USSR, with which the Soviets took 
issue. Instead of expressing regret as the Turkish government had on an earlier occasion, 
Ambassador Erkin indicated that the Soviet press “broke the truce” and stated that the 
Turkish press would behave when the Soviets behaved.52  
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Throughout 1946, the USSR made attempts to connect with the Kurdish 
populations within Turkey in order to sow discord within the country. However, the 
Soviets did not have a lot of success in this endeavor. Through the press, the USSR 
advocated for an autonomous Kurdistan, but because of the Kurds’ location in eastern 
Turkey and the Soviets’ lack of ability to arm Turkish Kurds, this policy did not prove 
useful to them.53 
Unfortunately, Soviet troop positioning along Turkish borders required the Turks 
to maintain a large army, which negatively impacted Turkey’s economy.54 A significant 
portion of Turkey’s budget went to the Turkish Armed Forces, prohibiting the 
government from having the funds to develop the economy in the post-war arena. 
In mid-March 1946, Turkey received reports of Soviet troop movement in 
northern Iran. This was not an immediate concern because wet roads would temporarily 
prevent the troops from being able to continue moving, at least until the roads dried up.55 
It was possible that these troop movements were part of the continued war of nerves 
against Turkey. The US assured Turkey that it would back Turkey in the case of foreign 
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aggression, but reminded the Turkish government that it could not offer Turkey a blank 
check for this issue.56  
At this time, Turkey had to consider whether or not it wanted to reduce its 
military. As Turkey used a system of conscription, leaders had to consider what they 
would do with their upcoming class of cadets.57 Maintaining a large military was 
incredibly costly for the government, but with the USSR looming on Turkey’s borders, 
the large military could be worth the significant cost.  
 
American aid: Loans and materials 
In light of potential military conflict with the USSR, Turkey expressed concerns 
about its lack of military materials and requested immediate assistance from the US, to 
which the US Ambassador to Turkey, Edwin Wilson, agreed. Turkey required mostly 
transport vehicles and materials, including 3,000 trucks, 1,000 automobiles and 45 tires. 
58  Additionally, Wilson observed that Turkey’s existing transport materials were in bad 
condition and would require replacements in the near future.59 In response, the Secretary 
of State authorized all Lend-Lease stores in the Middle East to be transferred to Turkey, 
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which would help to alleviate the situation.60 Ambassador Wilson also reiterated the 
strength of American concern about Turkey’s territorial integrity and security in a 
conversation with Saka.61 In February 1946, the US provided Turkey with the 
opportunity to purchase surplus equipment and felt it necessary to alert the USSR, in 
hopes that the USSR would not find this development suspicious.62 
The US reiterated that it would sell Turkey “such reasonable amounts of arms and 
equipment as they might wish to buy.”63 The US found it important to make sure Turkey 
did not appear to become aggressive towards the USSR, even though it did not find that 
to be a likely scenario, especially in the near future. Therefore, selling Turkey arms was a 
mutually beneficial situation, as these arms sales would improve Turkey’s defensive 
capabilities.  
The US realized that Turkish opinion and perception of the aid received relative 
to American aid given to other countries was an important consideration. Because of this, 
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it began to look for other ways to continue granting aid to Turkey, particularly through 
Bretton Woods institutions.64  
As of May 1946, the ExImBank was the only source of financial aid to Turkey. In 
a discussion with Foreign Service Officer Loy Henderson, the Turkish Ambassador 
requested a $25 million loan. Henderson indicated that there was a possibility that this 
loan would be granted, but it absolutely would not exceed that amount. As Turkey 
differed from other European countries, since it had not been completely demolished by 
World War II, Henderson reasoned that Turkey might have some luck acquiring private 
loans. However, he indicated he would pursue the possibility of the US granting Turkey 
the requested loan.65 
In June, Henderson called for a credit ceiling of $25 million for Turkey.66 As the 
Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, his proposal held weight and 
was thus taken into consideration. 
The US continued to wish for the UK to provide Turkey with additional military 
equipment, as the US remained only interested in providing economic support to 
                                                     
64 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, The Near East and Africa, Volume VII, ed. S. Everett 
Gleason (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1969), Document 708. 
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1946v07/d708 
65 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, The Near East and Africa, Volume VII, ed. S. Everett 
Gleason (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1969), Document 712. 
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1946v07/d712 
66 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, The Near East and Africa, Volume VII, ed. S. Everett 
Gleason (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1969), Document 3.  
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1946v07/d3 
 25 
Turkey.67 The Turkish government also had plans to ask the US for additional loans and 
military equipment, which the US considered important, because it viewed Greece and 
Turkey as the only obstacles for the USSR.68 While the US did not have an understanding 
as to why the UK would not provide these arms to Turkey, it found Turkey’s need for 
combat materials to be important enough to potentially be willing to arm the Turks, 
despite its preference to assist Turkey in a purely economic capacity.  
 
Kars/Ardahan/Straits 
In response to Soviet pressures to revise the Montreux Convention, the US 
suggested that an international conference might be ideal, and that the US would 
willingly participate if invited to such a conference. The US did not indicate interest in 
calling for such a conference.69  
Turkey remained apprehensive due to Soviet claims for Turkish territories in Kars 
and Ardahan. Although the USSR had made these claims previously, the Soviet 
government explicitly brought up the need to discuss these territories in conjunction with 
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talks to renew the Treaty of Friendship in 1946. 70 The Soviet Union made allegations 
that Kars and Ardahan shared similarities with Azerbaijan, but the Turks did not feel that 
this was an accurate assessment of the situation. The Turks argued that Kars and Ardahan 
were populated by Turks who spoke Turkish and who did not take issue with the central 
government of Turkey, which had not been the situation when Azerbaijan wished to 
separate from Persia.71 In a conversation held by the Secretary of State with the Turkish 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Saka assured the Secretary of State that,  
while the character of the Turkish people as a whole was to 
be patient, if the Soviet Govt used any pretext to bring 
about the seizure of the eastern provinces or any other 
Turkish territory, the Turkish people would meet such a 
situation with firm resolution and [Saka] was sure the result 
would be armed conflict. [Saka] said further that he could 
give me every assurance that the Turkish Govt would give 
no occasion whatever for provocation in the present 
situation but that the Govt and people in Turkey were 
firmly resolved to resist any attempt to take their territory 
by force.72  
 
These assurances demonstrated consistency in Turkish resolve to reject Soviet 
expansionism and became an attitude that American diplomats came to respect and rely 
on as Turkish-American relations continued to develop.  
In continued discussions about renewing the Treaty of Friendship, the topic of 
conversation reverted to Kars and Ardahan. When confronted with the fact that the border 
between Turkey and the USSR had been determined in 1921, Soviet Ambassador Sergei 
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Vinogradov remarked that Russia was weak at that time, so the treaty required renewed 
attention.73 In a following conversation with Turkish Foreign Minister Sümer, 
Vinogradov explicitly threatened Sümer after Sümer rejected his proposals for Soviet 
participation in defense of the Straits. Insisting the USSR could not withdraw its request 
for joint control over the Straits in consideration of its own security, Vinogradov stated, 
“We waited long time regarding arrangement we wanted with Poland and finally got it; 
we can wait regarding Turkey.”74 This veiled threat came in the same conversation in 
which Vinogradov placed the blame for poor Turkish-Soviet relations on Turkish 
reluctance to work with the Soviets on defense of the Straits.  
After discussing revisions to the Montreux Convention with the United States, the 
Turks expressed their agreements with the US proposal and indicated they would like to 
proceed with those revisions.75 
The US also expressed frustration about Soviet claims to Kars and Ardahan, 
especially considering that Stalin had drawn the border with Turkey.76  At the time of 
negotiations, Turkey and Russia had argued about the areas of Batum and Kars. Stalin 
drew the border between the two regions that were denoted in the treaty.  
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At the beginning of March, Sümer and Vinogradov held another meeting where 
they discussed the state of Turkish-Soviet relations. Vinogradov asserted that the UK and 
Turkey had allied to oppose the USSR, which Sümer asserted was not accurate. 
According to Sümer, the UK wanted to see better relations between Turkey and the 
USSR, including a renewal of the treaty of friendship because it would have contributed 
to positive relations between all three countries.77 Vinogradov responded that if Turkey 
wished to renew discussions about a treaty of friendship, the conditions under which the 
USSR would be willing to talk were already clear. Sümer clarified that Turkey had not 
asked for a treaty of friendship, but did want friendly relations with the USSR, as they 
neighbored each other. After this point, Vinogradov made a statement indicating that if 
Turkey relinquished Kars and Ardahan, it would “be more than compensated 
elsewhere.”78 Sümer clearly stated that Turkey was not interested in trading territories 
and the subject was dropped. The discussion ended in a professional, but unresolved 
manner.79 This example of discussions between Turkey and the USSR at this point in 
time elucidates the difficult position in which Turkey found itself. It was evident that the 
USSR had clear objectives in mind that it sought to achieve and that it did not have an 
interest in relinquishing them. The USSR had the willingness to wait and press the issue 
again in the future.  
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Throughout April, the USSR assured the US it had no intentions of attacking 
Turkey.80 However, all parties were aware of the risk that having no control over the 
Straits posed to the Soviet Union. In discussions with the USSR, the US proposed the 
possibility of the UN administering security in the Straits and the Dardanelles, to which 
the USSR did not respond negatively to.81 However, this never came to fruition because 
the US prioritized Turkish sovereignty over the Straits while the USSR prioritized 
acquiring its own control over the Straits.  
The USSR continued to apply pressure on Turkey, with Stalin insisting that 
without a Russian base somewhere in the Mediterranean, the freedom of passage through 
the Straits provided little value to the Soviets.82 The USSR continued to ask for bilateral 
talks with Turkey regarding the Straits, which Turkey was hesitant to accept.83 
August brought renewed conversations and considerations about Soviet-Turkish 
relations. Continuing to protest the Montreux Convention, the Soviet Union sent a note to 
Turkey detailing all the ways in which Turkey had failed to uphold the Convention 
during the second World War. The Soviets intended for this to serve as a reasonable 
explanation for their concerns about the Convention as it stood. In this letter, the Soviets 
brought up three specific examples: a German patrol boat was allowed through the Straits 
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into the Black Sea in July 1941; an Italian auxiliary war vessel was allowed to pass 
through the Straits to the Black Sea in August 1941; and German warships disguised as 
merchant vessels were allowed through the Straits to the Black Sea.84 The USSR held 
that each of these examples served as a violation of the Montreux Convention. Turkey’s 
failure to abide by the Convention during a time of war solidified the Soviet perspective 
that it should have joint control over the Bosporus.  
However, the US responded by detailing the ways in which the Soviet note was 
either incorrect or misrepresented events. According to the US, all of these vessels were 
borderline under the Convention’s definitions of war vessels, and they were all disguised 
as merchant vessels. Additionally, the US asserted that, “in general the Turks in the 
period of Axis ascendency were stiffly correct, favoring neither side; as Allied fortunes 
mounted the Turks interpreted the Montreux Convention more and more to favor the 
Allies.”85 By defending Turkey’s implementation of the Convention, the US continued to 
develop its support for Turkey’s sole control over the Straits. American support on this 
issue also served to show the capacity for interpretation, as the Americans had a very 
different perspective on these individual events than did the Soviets.  
Additionally, due to continued Soviet pressure about revising the Convention, 
Turkey determined it would no longer talk with the USSR about the Straits or about the 
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note that the Soviets had sent to Turkey regarding the Straits.86 Because the Soviets were 
continuously unyielding on their intended revisions, the Turkish government did not find 
it productive to continue to discuss their conditions with the Soviets.  
Although Turkey considered discussions with the USSR about the Montreux 
Convention to be over, the Soviets had a different viewpoint.87 They intended to keep the 
door for discussions open and were optimistic that a new Turkish Ambassador to the 
USSR would be open to discussing the Straits; but the Turkish government assured the 
US that it did not intend for that to be the case.88  
 
Turkish-American speculation about Soviet motives 
The US and Turkey speculated heavily about Soviet intentions with regard to 
Turkey. A popular speculation indicated that the USSR’s primary goal was to end the 
Anglo-Turkish alliance, although Soviet Ambassador Vinogradov asserted that was not a 
Soviet goal.89 It was also considered possible that the Soviets merely wanted control over 
the Straits, which the US found problematic because it thought the Straits constituted an 
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international issue.90 This view drew support from discussions with Bulgarian 
Ambassador Antonoff, who asserted that the most important area, from the Soviet 
viewpoint, concerned an agreement with Turkey about the Straits. 
In early 1946, the Bulgarian Minister Antonoff invited Turkish Acting Foreign 
Minister Sümer to dinner, where he brought up Turkish-Soviet relations and their 
potential for improvement. In this discussion, Antonoff asserted that the issues harming 
Turkish-Soviet relations stemmed from the Turkish government, and that if Saraçoğlu 
were to replace İnönü as the head of government, many of those issues would be 
solved.91 Sümer immediately reported this to Erkin, who chose to call Antonoff in for a 
meeting, where he confronted Antonoff about this discussion. Throughout this 
discussion, Antonoff insisted that the views he presented were only personal in nature 
and that he had brought it up because he felt the solidity of Turkish-Soviet relations 
heavily impacted Bulgarian security.92 The Turkish government considered this to be yet 
another tactic by the Soviets in their war of nerves.93 
Meanwhile the US attempted to predict why and how the USSR chose states on 
which to exert pressure. The US determined that reasons included situations where 
governments “directly oppose Soviet foreign policy aims…where they seal their 
territories off against Communist penetration…or where they compete too strongly…for 
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moral domination among elements which it is important for Communists to dominate.”94 
With this hypothesis, US diplomats attempted to understand Soviet pressure and its 
implementation, particularly in Turkey, where these factors were in play. 
 In light of the fact that air power made control of the Straits less important than it 
had been at the time the Montreux Convention was signed, Ambassador Wilson indicated 
to the US Secretary of State that Soviet aim was actually domination of Turkey.95 The 
Soviets used the Straits as a pretext to claim territorial sovereignty over the Straits, but 
Ambassador Wilson believed it would be more advantageous for the Soviets to 
manufacture a Turkey that was friendly to the USSR. This distinction played an 
important role in the continued calculus of Soviet intentions with regard to pursuing 
bilateral negotiations with Turkey about the Straits and renewing the Treaty of 
Friendship.  
These developments led to greater discussion between the US and Turkey and 
within the US about Soviet intentions pertaining to Turkey. Although Stalin, unprompted 
by questions, said three times in a meeting with Czech leaders that the Soviets would not 
attack Turkey, US advisers still saw the Soviet Union as a serious threat.96 Therefore they 
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considered it vital to show Turkey support. The US actors continued to view the Soviet 
proposals for the Convention as incompatible with Turkish sovereignty.97 
 
Strengthening Turkish-American Ties 
In 1946, Turkish Ambassador to the United States, Müner Ertegün, passed away 
and the US sent the USSR Missouri to carry his body back to Turkey, sailing into the 
Black Sea as a show of American friendship with Turkey.98 This decision positively 
impacted the psychological aspects of Turkish-American relations and had a powerful 
effect on other regional actors, signaling to the USSR in particular that the US intended to 
ally more strongly with Turkey. According to Ambassador Wilson, “there are already 
indications that the effects of the Missouri visit are being felt beyond Turk frontiers…the 
Missouri visit is thus apt to take on character of one of those imponderable events 
influence of which extends far beyond [the] immediate theater in which it occurs.”99 
The US continued to prioritize its relations with Turkey, and US diplomats took 
opportunities to reiterate American commitment to developing a friendship with Turkey. 
For example, in a chance meeting between US Secretary Byrnes and the Turkish 
Ambassador to Paris, Byrnes indicated the US’s deep interest in Turkey’s problems and 
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continued intention for a friendship with Turkey, to which the Turkish Ambassador 
responded positively.100  
As the US realized it would likely be collaborating more significantly with Greece 
and Turkey because of their relationship with the UK, it took the position that it would be 
beneficial for states surrounding Turkey to see American warships in the Mediterranean 
and at Greek and Turkish ports so they could begin to perceive US presence as a regular 
occurrence, not a particular political or diplomatic gesture.101   
Overall, 1946 was characterized by the American attempt to decide whether or 
not it was willing to step up to defend Turkey in the event of a Soviet incursion.102 The 
UK and the USSR fundamentally clashed in the Middle East due to their contradictory 
goals and desires. The US found itself involved in this clash as the Cold War began to 
develop and saw its role in the Middle East as simply upholding the principles of the 
United Nations.103 As the US became more directly involved in Turkey’s economic and 
military situations in the next years, its policy concerning defending Turkey in the event 
of a Soviet attack became clearer, eventually culminating in Turkey’s accession into 
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NATO. However, at the end of 1946, this future position could not have been predicted 






















Chapter 2: Where Things Start to Get Serious 
 1947 brought the first significant indication of change in Turkish-American 
relations: the implementation of the Truman Doctrine. The Truman Doctrine explicitly 
set out to provide Turkey with consistent aid, which previously had not been a factor in 
relations between these states. Additionally, the Truman Doctrine and additional aid 
packages enhanced Turkish-American relations because it served as an example of the 
US’s prioritization of its association with Turkey. Events in 1947-1949 paved the way for 
the deeply integrated alliance that would come in the 1950s.  
 
US/UK collaboration 
1947 began with continued consideration of Soviet intentions and optimal US 
involvement in Turkey, both economically and militarily. In January, the Soviets 
dislodged politically from Azerbaijan, but the US did not think this meant the USSR 
would decrease its advances on Turkey.104 The Ambassador in the Soviet Union believed 
that the Soviets wanted free, independent naval access to the Mediterranean and that they 
would continue to operate to achieve that goal.105 
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As Soviet intentions would not likely change, the US acknowledged that Turkey 
would need continued, long term support from both the US and the UK.106 However, the 
US was unwilling to provide military equipment to Turkey at that time. The US felt that 
due to the UK’s history of involvement with Turkey, the UK had continued responsibility 
of military aid.107 The US also reiterated to the Turkish government that Turkey, not any 
other state, should have primary responsibility over the Straits.108 The US held strong 
opposition to the idea of proposing a regional defense agreement for the Straits to be 
made between Turkey, the US, the UK, and the USSR.109 In the opinion of the Secretary 
of State, if the US agreed to participate in a regional arrangement to defend the Straits, 
that would confirm the Soviet view that Turkey alone could not adequately defend the 
Straits. A regional arrangement would reinvigorate diplomatic issues on an already 
contentious topic. To effectively support Turkish sovereignty, it was paramount that 
Turkey maintained primary responsibility over the Straits. 
 February 1947 showed that relations between Turkey, the US, and the UK were 
shifting in ways that would have serious lasting consequences. During this month, the 
UK informed the US that due to domestic financial issues, it could no longer afford to 
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provide economic or military assistance to Greece or Turkey.110 As Greece and Turkey 
were already considered vital to stopping Soviet expansion into the Mediterranean, the 
US viewed this development as a major concern. American advisors began to strategize 
on how they should respond to the pending reduction of funds for Greece and Turkey 
from the UK. 
 
Public Law 75 
In American policy discussions, diplomats emphasized the importance of 
encouraging the American people to see the value assisting Greece and Turkey. They also 
considered how the US would provide this assistance with the required congressional 
support.111 As any aid to Greece and Turkey would come from federal taxes, popular 
support for the initiative would substantially strengthen American capacity to provide aid 
to Greece and Turkey. Additionally, strong public support could facilitate congressional 
approval for aid. The US was very aware that agreeing to aid one of these states would 
require aiding the other; they came as a package deal.112 Although the situations in both 
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states differed, the urgency with which they required aid was the same.113 Both Greece 
and Turkey intended to avoid falling into the Soviet sphere of influence, but needed aid to 
ensure that did not happen. In discussions and meetings, emphasis was placed on the 
importance of Turkey to the United States and Turkey’s proven usefulness in resisting 
Communism and Soviet pressure.114 The continued Soviet war of nerves incentivized 
prompt US support to Turkey, as Turkey’s economy was being tested by its continued 
maintenance of a large standing army. At the end of February 1947, President Truman 
approved of the plans to proceed in lending assistance to these states.115  
As the situation continued to develop, Turkey continued to request military aid 
from the US. However, the US saw the USSR as the only real threat for Turkey, and it 
didn’t anticipate any Soviet aggression in the near future.116 The continuation of the war 
of nerves seemed much more likely, in the eyes of the Americans. Yet, the Americans 
were aware of the severe burden that maintaining Turkish armed forces placed on 
Turkey’s economy and saw a need to modernize Turkish forces because of the extent to 
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which their equipment was outdated.117 President Truman approved aid to Greece and 
Turkey on March 5 and addressed Congress in a joint session on March 12.118 
The US was aware of what Greece needed in terms of aid and wanted the UK to 
continue its training missions in Greece, but the UK indicated that its aid would cease on 
March 31.119 The US did not know what Turkey needed in terms of aid and sought to 
figure out what it required.120 As the US determined it would provide additional 
assistance to Greece and Turkey, American diplomats debated on whether or not to send 
a letter to the UN about its new plans.121 The US prioritized international perception of its 
actions in Turkey and viewed communication with the UN about its intentions as a way 
to maintain its reputation as an honest broker. Ambassador Wilson informed the State 
Department that regardless of what the US decided in terms of details about aid, it should 
communicate openly with the Turkish government about all details.122 
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One provision of American aid to Turkey stipulated that the US could monitor 
how the aid was utilized. This made the Turks averse to accepting the aid, as they saw 
this provision as an American attempt to exercise control within Turkey.123 The US 
assured Turkey that this was not the case; it merely wanted to know how the aid would be 
implemented. As of April 7, $400 million in aid to Greece and Turkey had obtained 
congressional approval.124 The State Department indicated to Congress that aid to Greece 
and Turkey was urgent.125 The State Department determined that most of the aid to 
Turkey should be used for military supplies and equipment, stepping away from the 
previous policy that only intended to provide economic aid.126  
On May 9, the Bill on aid to Greece and Turkey passed in the House of 
Representatives.127 In response to the continuation of this process, the USSR publicly let 
its displeasure be known. In a Soviet newspaper, the US was described as carrying a 
“bomb in one pocket and an Easter egg in other”, specifically in response to American 
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aid extended to Greece and Turkey.128 This example sought to highlight perceived 
American hypocrisy for promoting democracy in Greece and Turkey while seeking to 
undermine the Soviet Union. The US prepared for Soviet retaliation to counter the Greece 
& Turkey bill.129 
Following the passing of the Bill in the House, the USSR continued to disparage 
the US in the press, reminding the US that this policy did not do anything to restrain the 
USSR.130 According to the Soviet paper Pravda, the “Americans at [the] same time 
showed complete disregard for Turkish sovereignty, entrusting to special military 
representatives not only determination of the program of works to be carried out on 
Turkish territory, but also the direction of their carrying out political tasks which are at 
the basis of ‘Truman Doctrine’ and which correspond admirably to interests American 
industrialists.”131 Additionally, the paper asserted that “from a military viewpoint Turkey 
has ceased [to] be an independent country.”132 However, the US establishment did not see 
itself as dictating how Turkey’s military and economy should develop.  
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In contrast, the UK indicated a strong interest in determining what the Turkish 
military needed and how that should be implemented, but the US disagreed, believing 
Turkey needed to be involved in that discussion.133 According to Ambassador Wilson, 
Turkey responded positively to the passage of the Truman Doctrine, both in the 
government and in public opinion. The Truman Doctrine indicated, to Turks, American 
dedication to upholding Turkey’s sovereignty. Additionally, the anticipated military and 
economic aid stood to vastly improve Turkey’s economy, which was positively received 
across the board.134 The emphasis on aid to Turkey came from Turkey’s need for 
modernization, which was where the US determined it would focus its efforts.  
 In July, the House approved the full budget of $400 million.135 The US 
determined how the aid would be appropriated between Greece and Turkey and came to 
conclusions about what Turkey needed in terms of assistance. For Turkey, the goal was to 
facilitate the Turkish armed forces to “provide a deterrent of such a nature to a potential 
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aggressor that an all-out costly war would be necessary for the aggressor, in order to 
realize territorial or political objectives in Turkey.”136 
 Soviet Marshal Bulganin, in a conversation with the Turkish Ambassador to 
Moscow, indicated his displeasure at Turkey’s continued reception of American aid. 
According to Bulganin, “Turkey had placed herself under American hegemony, was 
allowing the US Army [to] create bases in Turkey and [was] serving as instrument of 
US’s plans to prepare war against USSR.”137    
 
Turkey’s demobilization/modernization 
The US viewed Turkey not only as vital for the security of the Middle East as a 
whole, but also as a test case for the Middle East.138 If Turkey acquired the capability to 
withstand Soviet pressure and maintain a positive relationship with western democracies, 
then it would be possible for other Middle Eastern states to do the same. 
 Foreign Minister Saka reached out to Ambassador Wilson to further discuss 
whether or not Turkey should reduce its armed forces. Turkey needed to quickly make a 
decision, as it would have to determine whether to call upon a new class of armed 
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forces.139 The Turkish government stood divided on how to respond. Some members of 
government believed it was economically necessary to reduce forces, yet others 
continued to consider the international situation to be too dangerous to reduce the armed 
forces. Ambassador Wilson’s view on the issue was that the Turks should continue to 
maintain their armed forces and consider a reduction after another year.140 
 In September, Turkey decided to demobilize one existing class from its military in 
order to improve the economic situation.141 However, the demobilization did not solve 
Turkey’s budget deficit, prompting Turkey to ask the US for additional aid.142 The State 
Department approved the transfer of $45,420,000 in aid to Turkey under the Truman 
Doctrine.143 In October, the US reassured Turkey that it did not anticipate any immediate 
danger of war. Even with the demobilization of forces, the USSR would not likely 
reinvigorate any of its actions against Turkey.144  
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In a conversation between the Secretary of State and the Foreign Minister of 
Greece, the possibility of a pact of friendship between Greece and Italy was broached.145 
If this pact were to be created, Greece and Italy considered Turkey’s inclusion and 
potential further extension to other eastern Mediterranean states. This serves as an early 
example of discussions about regional arrangements, which became more common as the 
Cold War scenario solidified.  
 The Turkish government asked for the US’s opinion about whether a declaration 
of solidarity with Greece would be advisable. Ambassador Wilson found this unwise and 
advised that this task should be left to the United Nations.146 
 As the US continued to collaborate with the UK, Greece and Turkey on military 
issues, the UK clarified that its troops were not in Greece to protect Greece in the case of 
an attack but to deter potential attacks.147 This clarification stood to ensure that none of 
the involved parties placed too much reliance on British presence in the region. 
Yugoslavia was an important state for the USSR, particularly because of its geographic 
                                                     
145 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The Near East and Africa, Volume V, ed. S. Everett 
Gleason (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1971), Document 230.  
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1947v05/d230 
146 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The Near East and Africa, Volume V, ed. S. Everett 
Gleason (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1971), Document 257.  
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1947v05/d257 
147 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The Near East and Africa, Volume V, ed. S. Everett 
Gleason (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1971), Document 269.  
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1947v05/d269 
 48 
location. Yugoslavia offered access to the Adriatic and Mediterranean seas, shared 
borders with Greece, Turkey, Austria, and Italy, and could provide food and raw 
materials to the USSR.148 For this reason, Yugoslavia remained a point of interest for 
both the USSR and the US, and would begin to play a role in American interactions with 
Mediterranean states.  As American cooperation with Turkey continued, policy makers 
clarified that in general, they would prefer to give Turkey an estimation on situations 
rather than advice, which was commonly the British strategy.149 The US did not want to 
determine Turkish policy, and did not want the USSR to perceive that the US was 
attempting to use Turkey as a puppet. Therefore, the US avoided giving Turkey explicit 
advice. The US also considered that the USSR wanted Turkey to continue to have a 
severe economic burden, in hopes that would cause Turkey to cede to Soviet wishes, and 
would not cease applying pressure to ensure Turkey maintained a large military force.150  
 
Public Law 75 and its Implementation 
American concern about Turkey’s sovereignty and independence continued to 
grow throughout 1948. In early 1948, the National Security Council affirmed that the 
security of the eastern Mediterranean, and Turkey in particular, remained crucial for 
American security. Therefore, the US should support states in this region to the extent 
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possible.151 Although Public Law 75 had been approved, due to logistical issues, its 
implementation had been delayed, causing concern for the Turkish government and the 
public.152 The issues with implementation might have come from differing standards and 
experience between Turkish and American shipping companies.153  Maintaining positive 
public opinion of the United States in Turkey was imperative, especially due to the fear 
that a drop in public opinion might incentivize some Turks to find Communism, or 
tighter relations with the USSR, more appealing.154  
The US found it necessary to assure the American public that Turkey was 
working as much as it could to help itself and that American aid was necessary to allow 
Turkey to protect itself.155 As aid to Turkey came from taxes, positive American public 
opinion remained a priority for those advocating for continued aid to Greece and Turkey. 
The primary focus for American aid remained modernizing and strengthening the Turkish 
army.156 The USSR continued to pose the greatest threat to Turkey and to the Eastern 
Mediterranean as a whole, which the US agreed was vital to its own security. While 
administering aid, the US found it important to make its intentions about Greece and 
Turkey completely clear in order to avoid Soviet misinterpretation, which could lead to a 
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dangerous situation. The Turkish government indicated it also found it important for the 
US to make its intentions about Turkey known to the USSR, particularly that, “the United 
States demonstrates conclusively to the Soviets that [they] mean business.”157 The US 
also considered providing a firm public commitment to Turkey or giving Turkey more 
money to alleviate the situation and solidify positive Turkish public opinion about 
American aid.158 The Americans viewed Turkish confidence in its ability to reject Soviet 
advances as directly correlated to its willingness to reject them. Therefore, reiterating 
American support to Turkey had great value.  
The US intended to support the Eastern Mediterranean, but found it necessary that 
the UK continue to provide support to the region as well, despite the UK’s declared 
intention to pull back.159 In an address to Congress in which he argued for continued aid 
to Greece and Turkey, President Truman stated, “I believe that it must be the policy of 
the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by 
armed minorities or by outside pressures… Should we fail to aid Greece and Turkey in 
this fateful hour, the effect will be far-reaching to the West as well as to the East. We 
must take immediate and resolute action.”160 
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In June, the House Appropriations Committee recommended cutting the funds to 
Greece and Turkey to $200 million due to perception that guerrilla warfare in Greece 
would conclude by the end of 1948.161 The State Department responded with a request 
for $275 million, to make sure the aid programs continued to be successful, but ended up 
with $225 million.162 As the internal issues in Greece posed the most pressing issue for 
Greece and Turkey, the State Department determined that if Greece needed additional 
funding, that funding would come from the funds allocated to Turkey.163  
In October, the State Department determined it should defer the remaining $25 
million in its Greece/Turkey budget pending developments in the guerilla warfare in 
Greece.164 In assessing long-term interests in Turkey, the US decided it needed to reduce 
or eliminate its military assistance in Turkey. It also recognized there would be no funds 
for assisting Turkey after 1948 unless there was Congressional approval.165 
 
Western European Security Guarantee 
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May brought additional difficulties to the Turkish-American relationship. The US 
publicly gave Western Europe a security guarantee, but did not offer a similar guarantee 
to Turkey.166 The Turks viewed this as problematic and feared that the USSR would 
interpret this action as an indication that the US did not value Turkey as much as Western 
Europe.167 They asserted that this action undermined Turkish morale and gave credence 
to the small minority in Turkey that believed Turkey should submit to the Soviet 
Union.168 The US responded by reminding Turkey of the massive amounts of aid the US 
was providing to Turkey, to which the Turks responded that a cheaper and better solution 
would be to extend a security guarantee to Turkey. Secretary of State George Marshall 
reminded the Turks that the US had to operate with consideration of the legislative 
process and the role of the press.169 The US also reminded Turkey that it would not 
provide military aid indefinitely.170 The aid to Turkey was meant to assist Turkey in the 
creation of a military force that could be sustained without continuous external support. 
The US did not want Turkey to rely on this aid indefinitely.  
 
Pacts as a Policy 
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Turkish Ambassador Erkin informed his American counterparts that there were 
discussions about an entente forming between Greece, Italy, Turkey and the Arab States, 
which would provide opportunities for these states to ally more closely economically and 
politically.171 While Turkey was not necessarily opposed to such an entente, it preferred 
the possibility of the US offering Turkey a security guarantee similar to the one the UK 
had offered Greece in 1939.172 Greece also indicated that the Great Powers should be 
involved in any entente, even an Eastern Mediterranean entente. The US welcomed any 
additional collaboration between Italy, Greece, Turkey, and the Arab States.173 In 
particular, this was due to the fact that the US viewed the Arab States as more susceptible 
to Communism and Soviet influence and believed that Italy, Greece, and Turkey could 
serve as positive leaders for the region. However, the US did not have any interest in 
involving itself in any additional pacts or ententes at this time, as it believed involvement 
would stretch American resources too thin.  
In April of 1948, most of the discussions between Turkey and the United States 
concerned the development of a Middle East Pact, which would include a mutual security 
guarantee. Although Greece supported the formation of a Middle East Pact, Turkey found 
such a pact problematic for several reasons: it would be unrealistic and ineffective; it 
might make their position more dangerous by providing a false sense of security without 
providing any actual security; it might give the USSR reason to step up its actions against 
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Turkey and the rest of the region.174 Therefore, Turkey was reluctant to join any regional 
grouping, particularly if there was no security guarantee from the US. The Turks also 
thought it would be unlikely the Arab States would ally with Greece or Turkey because 
both states had strong ties with the US and the UK.175 The UK’s colonial involvement in 
the Arab states did not encourage Arab states to ally with the UK, and the US by 
extension. Additionally, a lasting dispute between Turkey and Syria about their border 
would not encourage other Arab States to have an interest in collaborating with 
Turkey.176 The State Department also determined that it did not oppose a joint declaration 
from Greece and Turkey, but thought that a declaration including Italy as well would be 
even better.177  
In a conversation with Secretary Marshall, Turkish Ambassador Erkin stated, 
“Turkey’s foreign policy…is firmly based on friendship, cooperation and solidarity with 
the United States.”178 The Turkish government continued to be concerned that the Soviet 
Union was using propaganda targeting Turkey’s economic and political difficulties to 
soften Turkey into agreeing to a friendship pact.179 Ambassador Erkin suggested that a 
possible regional arrangement with Greece, Turkey, and the US or UK could alleviate 
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some of the pressure from the Soviets.180  In an attempt to explain continued Soviet 
pressure on Turkey, Secretary Marshall reminded Erkin that, “[t]he implementation of 
Soviet foreign policy, being based on a gangster system, costs very little.”181 
Turkey requested closer relations with the US and viewed a regional arrangement 
as an avenue.182 The new emphasis on US interest in Western Europe had the potential to 
make the entire Soviet periphery nervous; and some viewed it necessary for the US to 
declare its support for countries outside Western Europe.183 The US saw potential 
benefits in entering into additional regional arrangements, but did not intend to pursue the 
matter without further consideration.184  
 
American Vision for the Future of Turkish-American Relations 
Towards the end of 1948, American policymakers had to determine how their 
relationship with Greece and Turkey would continue. Were these countries going to 
continue to be categorized separately in terms of aid, or would they be lumped together 
with foreign aid more broadly?185 In a message to Secretary Marshall, the Ambassador to 
Greece stated, “The democratic defense of Europe must hinge on England and 
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Turkey.”186 The Joint Chiefs of Staff determined that the matter, due to the strategic 
location of Greece and Turkey and the potential for the USSR to launch operations from 
bases in the Straits and the Aegean, required continued consideration.187 Additionally, 
Turkey’s military potential and spirit made them able to stand up to USSR incursion, 
especially with US support. Therefore, the Department determined it should request $100 
million for Turkey.188 
 As the Atlantic Pact and its formation remained under consideration, Turkey’s 
potential inclusion was a topic of discussion. At this point in time, it was highly unlikely 
that Turkey would be included because it was not an Atlantic country and NATO needed 
to see how the Atlantic Pact would develop before expanding the organization.189 The US 
preferred that Turkey not request inclusion at this point in time, but added that “Turks 
should be patient but should not be discouraged. We will not overlook their importance 
or their security problems.”190 The Department determined it would allocate $75 million 
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to Turkey for fiscal year 1949, and $300 million for Greece and Turkey more 
broadly.191192   
 
NATO and other pacts  
Greece and Turkey continued to be considered non-Atlantic countries, which 
solidified the reasoning for not allowing them into NATO.193 US policy held that 
Mediterranean countries would have to make their own decisions about regional 
groupings.194 The US saw that involving itself in some sort of Mediterranean pact would 
overextend its resources, in part because of the amount of aid it was providing the region. 
However, the Americans also realized that the Turkish government was utilizing 
American aid effectively and saw areas where aid would continue to enhance Turkey’s 
military and economic development.195  Additionally, they saw industries where renewed 
                                                     
191 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV, eds. S. 
Everett Gleason and Frederick Aandahl (Washington: United States and Government Printing Office, 
1974), Document 151.  https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1948v04/d151 
192 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV, eds. S. 
Everett Gleason and Frederick Aandahl (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1974) , 
Document 152.  https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1948v04/d152 
193 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume VI, eds. 
Herbert A. Fine, William Z. Slany, Lee H. Burke, Frederick Aandahl, David H. Stauffer, and Frederic A. 
Greenhut (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1977), Document 106.  
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1949v06/d106 
194 Ibid.  
195 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume VI, eds. 
Herbert A. Fine, William Z. Slany, Lee H. Burke, Frederick Aandahl, David H. Stauffer, and Frederic A. 
Greenhut (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1977), Document 1140.  
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1949v06/d1140 
 58 
interest and exploitation could help to further develop the economy, specifically in 
agriculture and in mineral and oil exploitation.196  
 As the Soviet Union perceived NATO as a threat, it began to threaten small 
nations that intended to join the organization, including Turkey and Norway.197 Due to 
these threats, President İnönü reiterated the importance of a formal commitment from the 
US regarding Turkey’s security.198 
 In a discussion about Turkey’s wish to be included in NATO, the geographic 
limitations of the organization, as stated in 1948, were revisited.199 It was originally 
intended to only include north Atlantic states. However, in 1949, Italy and French Algeria 
were included in the organization, which severely hurt Turkish public opinion.200 The 
Turks felt as though they were being abandoned. As the Turks had been actively resisting 
Soviet pressure for years, they took this development as a slap in the face and an 
indication that Turkey was not a priority for the United States.201 Secretary Marshall 
asserted that President Truman found Middle Eastern security and Turkey’s security, 
more specifically, as imperative. The Turks wondered, then, why US interest had shifted 
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from Turkey to Western Europe and why the US could not give Turkey a security 
guarantee. Marshall clarified that the only reason Italy and French Algeria were included 
was French insistence and that progress towards Turkey’s inclusion would occur, albeit 
slowly.202  
 In an attempt to reassure Turkey of continued US concern for Turkey’s security, 
President Truman addressed President İnönü stating, “The signing of the North Atlantic 
Treaty in no way diminishes the concern felt in the United States for the maintenance of 
the independence and integrity of Turkey and other free nations outside the Atlantic area; 
but rather, by strengthening the collective security of the Atlantic Treaty countries, the 
creation of this pact serves to enhance Turkey’s security as well.”203 
 British Foreign Secretary Bevin told the Turks to refrain from continuously 
asking the US to be included in NATO. He advised them not to strain Congress’s good 
will and reiterated that Congress is the final determiner of aid to Turkey and Turkey’s 
inclusion in international organizations.204 Turkish Foreign Minister Necmettin Sadak 
indicated that he wanted Turkey’s position in NATO to be reevaluated after the treaty 
was ratified. Bevin advised Turkey to not seek any additional pact with the US because 
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any new pact would require Congressional approval and the Truman Doctrine was 
working well for Turkey.205  
 At the Conference of Near Eastern Chiefs of Mission, which included all 
American diplomats in the Middle East, the US policymakers in the region determined 
that the US would not negotiate multilateral or bilateral security pacts with Near Eastern 
states until it was willing to commit the necessary military forces to carry out the pact.206 
The participants considered that unless the US had the willingness to carry out the pact, 
engaging in such a pact would put the states in greater danger. It also determined that it 
was undesirable to supply American arms to countries unless they already had the 
training capacity to use them.207  
 
Turkish budgetary concerns 
In 1949, Turkey was spending 48% of its budget on defense.208 As this amount 
was unsustainable, the US reiterated its commitment to providing military assistance to 
Turkey and ensured it worded this commitment in a way that would not provoke the 
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USSR.209 With the creation of NATO and increased tensions with the USSR, the US did 
not seek to further provoke the Soviets. In March of 1949, President İnönü publicly stated 
that, “[He] should like to lay particular stress on the precious military aid which has been 
given to us by the United States in one of the most critical periods which the world is 
going through, and for which the entire Turkish nation is imbued with the most profound 
gratitude.”210  
The Turkish budget difficulties remained serious and would continue to be serious 
for at least 3 years. It seemed likely the Turkish government would cut the 1950 defense 
budget below the inadequate 1949 level.211 The budget failed to provide funds for vital 
military needs, which threatened essential progress.212 Some suggested relief measures 
included: direct grant in aid in the minimum amount of $20 million, general authorization 
for AMAT to defray cost of imports authorized in the present defense budget along with 
nonbudgeted items, and placing Turkey on a grant basis for additional aid.213 
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Into the second half of 1949, US policymakers determined that they needed to 
continue military assistance to both Greece and Turkey.214 Turkey and the US shared a 
need for defense against the Soviet Union, meaning Turkey needed to be furnished with 
financial weapons in addition to military weapons.215 Turkey proposed some remedies for 
its economic situation, including: continuance of the Turkish Aid Program, inspired by 
the Truman Doctrine; stepping up economic assistance so that Turkey’s military 
establishment would be assured a self-sustaining economy. Turkey also requested $20 
million for wheat imports.216 At this point in time, Turkey’s defense appropriations had 
been reduced to 33% of the overall budget, which was still a significant amount.217 
Therefore, Turkey needed a reduction in its armed forces. 
The UK’s decision to end aid to Greece necessitated the end of its aid to Turkey. 
Turkey would have been able to support itself without any foreign aid if it hadn’t been 
under pressure to maintain such a substantial military force.218 US aid to Turkey had been 
granted for three purposes: to reassure Turkey of US determination to help Turkey; to 
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improve Turkey’s combat efficiency; to increase the confidence of the Turkish people.219 
It was, therefore, necessary to continue providing military assistance on a small scale 
indefinitely. Turkey needed economic development to increase its citizens’ standard of 
living and support its ability to resist attacks.220 
It became clear that it was unlikely that funds for the Turkish program would 
increase, but the that program would need to continue for at least two years.221 The State 
Department’s proposed funds for Turkey for the following year were listed as $25 
million, with the assumption that the program would receive $20 million that had been 
borrowed by the Greek program.222 However, the State Department requested $70 million 
in anticipation that the Turkish program would not receive more than a nominal amount 
from the Greek Program.223 
 
Airfield construction 
The Americans wondered if they should make arrangements with Turkey to 
construct airfields and stockpile aviation gasoline within Turkey’s borders.224 This move 
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seemed risky considering Turkey’s exclusion from NATO and American reluctance to 
offer a security guarantee. Additionally, it could induce the USSR to become more 
aggressive towards Turkey. Therefore, the US determined it was not a good idea in this 
moment, but it could be reviewed in the future. 
 The US and the UK discussed the potential for an aerial mapping survey of 
Turkey. The UK would complete the photographic component while the US took charge 
of the radar control, assuming Turkish approval.225 They found it preferable to only use 
one nation’s air force. Under renewed consideration, the US decided it should not seek an 
agreement about airfields and stockpiling aviation gasoline because it would provide the 
Soviet propaganda machine fuel to claim that the US and Turkey would be aggressive 
towards the USSR.226 The US should instead supplement the Turkish effort to develop a 
military base in Iskenderon-Adana area.227 The National Security Council reiterated that 
it was not the time to seek an arrangement with Turkey about constructing airfields, 
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stockpiling aviation gasoline, or conducting an aerial mapping project, postponing the 
discussion until a later time.228  
 
Continued American strategy 
 Turkey continued to be geographically important for strategic reasons. The US 
saw that it should assist Turks in developing sufficient military strength to deter outside 
aggression and enable them to control Straits and protect sovereign interests.229 The US 
should also increase the modernization and combat effectiveness of existing Turkish 
Army forces, naval forces, and air defense capabilities as well as providing equipment, 
maintenance, and spares.230   
 The years 1947-1949 firmly established US military aid to Turkey and facilitated 
collaboration between the two states both economically and militarily. However, as they 
entered the 1950s, the relationship between the US and Turkey would become more 
complicated because the NATO question became more pressing and the Cold War 
intensified with conflict in Korea.  
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Chapter Three: The Long Road to Accession 
 
 Once NATO had firmly been established in 1949, Turkey’s exclusion became a 
prominent feature in discussions between Turkish and American officials. The topic came 
up constantly and did not abate until Turkey eventually received an invitation to join the 
organization. Part of the difficulty in this process resulted from other NATO countries’ 
reluctance to expand the organization, and especially to include a country geographically 
removed from the original states, such as Turkey. The early 1950s consisted of 
negotiations between the US and Turkey, as well as with other NATO members, about 
Turkey’s exclusion from NATO, especially after Turkey participated in the Korean War. 
As the Cold War intensified, the Turkish-American alliance became more complicated.  
 
 
Continued Aid  
In terms of continuing American aid to Turkey, the US determined that it needed 
to acquire a detailed report of how the program was being implemented from the Turkish 
government.231 The Turkish budget was organized into two categories: national defense 
and economic development. As the amount of aid given to Turkey remained substantial, 
the US wanted to encourage Turkey to reduce its 1951 budget to include only the most 
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essential projects for its development.232. However, the US could not give Turkey 
assurances of grant aid at that time.233  
In determining finances for Turkey, it was confirmed that Turkey would receive 
approximately $81 million in FY 1950.234 The Turkish armed forces reduced from 
500,000 to 300,000, and yet 35-40% of the Turkish budget continued to go towards 
defense.235 
 It was important to the US to increase the standard of living in Turkey, which is 
why it continued to offer economic assistance.236 An increase in the standard of living 
would help ensure that the public remained supportive of a democratic government and 
would not encourage looking to the Soviet Union for increased resources. In 1950, the 
ECA aid to Turkey totaled $59 million and it was proposed Turkey would receive $30 
million from ECA in 1951.237 These 1950 funds primarily went to agricultural equipment, 
modernizing and enlarging coal mines, developing internal transportation, and 
developing power resources.  
The US continued to find value in extending aid to Turkey, as stated by Under 
Secretary of State James Webb, “[The] determination of Turkey to resist Soviet pressures 
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remains unshaken and its confidence in its ability to do so has been greatly fortified by 
the military aid extended by the United States, as well as by periodic public reiteration of 
the interest of the United States in its security and integrity.”238 Over the last year, the 
USSR released some of the pressure it had been exerting on Turkey, but it continued its 
press propaganda.239  
Due to the continued level of Turkey’s economic burden, the US determined it 
needed to continue aid to Turkey.240 As the US became involved in the training of 
Turkish forces, it wanted members of the Turkish military to be able to continue training 
their own forces, especially as the military continued to develop.241 The US determined 
that some of the aid to Turkey would be allocated to resurface the runways at three bases 
and to develop two additional bases in order to sustain growth in the Turkish Air 
Force.242  
The US made an informal agreement to limit its major fleet visits to three visits a 
year and to only use the ports at Izmir and Istanbul.243  The purpose of this agreement 
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was to allow major fleet visits, which asserted US support for Turkey and other 
Mediterranean states, while avoiding overwhelming Turkish ports. 
Despite collaboration and training with the US, the Turkish military continued to 
display deficiencies it would need to overcome to be effective in combat. Fortunately, 
continued cooperation would help to rectify these deficiencies and willingness to 
cooperate was present on both sides.244  
 
NATO Exclusion 
Although Turkey’s importance to the US had not diminished since 1947, the US 
remained unprepared to allow Turkey to join NATO.245 Ambassador Wadsworth passed 
along a message to the Turkish Foreign Minister, which indicated, “The territorial 
integrity and the national defense of Turkey was continuously in our minds; it was part of 
our overall thinking but not confined to thinking alone.”246 This message stood to show 
US resolve to continue to contribute to Turkey’s defense despite its exclusion from 
NATO.  
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NATO’s creation made peripheral countries insecure and unsure of US 
intentions.247 Greece and Turkey both wanted a regional security pact with the US.248 The 
US could not commit to a regional pact because it had not yet determined if it was 
already overcommitted in Europe.249 Greece and Turkey (and Iran) were unhappy with 
the US response to this issue.250  Greece, Turkey, and Iran would not make a security 
arrangement without US inclusion.251 However, according to US policy, US emphasis on 
NATO did not indicate a lessening interest in Greece or Turkey.252 Continued American 
aid and support in Greece and Turkey stood to prove that American interest in those 
states had not diminished.  
Ambassador Wadsworth told the US State Department of Secretary General Faik 
Akdur’s disappointment about Turkey’s continued exclusion from NATO. Akdur viewed 
Turkish inclusion in NATO as crucial for security and stability throughout the Near East, 
Mediterranean, and Europe.253 According to Akdur, Turkey saw many ways in which its 
membership in NATO would positively contribute to security throughout Europe and the 
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Middle East In part, this added to Turkey’s frustration about its inclusion in the 
organization.254  
Turkey’s participation in the Korean War intensified the continued exclusion from 
NATO and renewed the fervor with which Turkey pursued membership.255 In 1950, 
Turkey volunteered to send forces to assist in the Korean War, as a display of solidarity 
with the United States. While the US did not ask Turkey directly for troops, Turkey 
intended its participation to demonstrate its usefulness as a military ally. Additionally, the 
Turkish government intended for its participation in the war to prove that Turkey would 
be a valuable asset to NATO.256 
Including Greece and Turkey in NATO brought the question about how far 
NATO should extend. If NATO enlarges, the treaty would require revision.257 According 
to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, NATO was the US’s primary military commitment. Including 
Greece and Turkey in NATO at this point would stretch the capabilities of the 
organization too far, thus weakening NATO. NATO was not established enough to 
reasonably provide protection to its existing member states as well as Greece and Turkey, 
and the two states did not stand to offer enough support to the organization to balance the 
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cost of including them.258 The US viewed it as preferable to pursue alternatives and 
reconsider the issue in the future.  
 
Policy towards USSR 
 In continuing to develop policy towards the USSR, the US indicated that it was 
important for the “free powers” to determine a line that the USSR could not cross.259 It 
determined that line should include an USSR attack NATO but might also include an 
attack on Turkey.260  
The US suspected that the USSR did not possess a stockpile of atomic bombs, its 
navy was inadequate, and it had just begun to build a long range air force.261 For this 
reason, the US determined that the USSR was not likely to go to war at this time. While 
recounting recent conversations with members of the Turkish government, General 
Collins of the US navy stated, “The United States and Turkey are at the world’s 
geographic extremes, but their cooperation has been necessary and been carried out in a 
fine way, [such] that working together should be established as our national policies.”262 
When asked by the Turkish President about the American response to a Soviet attack on 
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Turkey, General Collins responded that the US would “bombard” the USSR if it attacked 
Turkey, assuming Congress declared war.263  
The US was unable to determine with any certainty what the Soviet intentions in 
the Balkans were.264 As the most likely scenario for an attack on Turkey would come 
from Bulgaria, the US found it prudent to plan a strategy for response to such an attack. 
The US concluded that without overt Soviet assistance, Bulgaria would be unlikely to 
take more than a small area in western Turkey. As this would not provide much benefit to 
the Bulgarians or the Soviets, the US considered it unlikely they would initiate this sort of 
attack.265 However, tensions between Bulgaria and Turkey became more pronounced in 
1950, when Bulgaria decided to return Bulgar Turks and Pomacks to Turkey. This 
initiative would send 250,000 people through the Bulgarian-Turkish border.266 Turkey 
did not intend to accept an influx of that quantity because of the magnitude. As at least 
some of these displaced persons would be able to enter Turkey, the Turkish government 
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requested additional aid from the US, as a massive influx of people into Turkey would 
continue to stretch Turkey’s finances.267  
 
Laying Mines in the Bosporus 
The Montreux Convention had a stipulation that allowed for revision 15 years 
after signing. As this point would occur in 1951, the USSR began to ramp up its pressure 
on Turkey.268 The Turkish government believed it needed a Mediterranean security pact, 
particularly in light of potential revision of the Montreux Convention.269 The Turkish 
government considered whether it wanted to lay mines in the Bosporus, near the Black 
Sea entrance to the Straits. Turkey decided to ask both the US and the UK about the 
legality of laying mines in the Bosporus under the Montreux Convention.270 The mines it 
proposed laying would not pose any danger to vessels passing through the Straits, unless 
they were activated in time of war. Even if a mine were to break loose, it would be 
inactive and would not damage any ships in the Straits.   
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The Montreux Convention did not preclude Turkey from laying mines in the 
Straits.271 In fact, the Convention contained a provision that stated, “Turkey may 
immediately remilitarize the zone of the Straits as defined in the preamble of the said 
Convention.”272 This provision was intended to be used in the case of war, particularly if 
the conflict would threaten Turkey. The US wanted to give Turkey a number of jets and 
needed to determine when to tell the Turks about this plan.273 Doing so earlier would 
enable the Turks to begin training earlier. It could also alleviate some of the frustrations 
coming from Turkey about its exclusion from NATO.  
The UK, however, considered laying mines in the Straits to be illegal under the 
Montreux Convention.274 This difference in opinion did not encourage the Turks to act 
one way or another and they indicated the US and UK should find common ground on the 
issue.  
The US decided that Turkey needed to determine for itself what it would do about 
laying mines in the Bosporus because the US did not want to share responsibility for the 
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mines if something should go wrong. Additionally, the US feared that if it gave too much 
encouragement, the Turks might interpret that the USSR posed a significant threat.275 
 
Turkish perspective  
In the May 1950 Turkish elections, the Democratic Party beat the Republican 
Peoples’ Party.276 This development had significance because the Republican People’s 
Party had been Atatürk’s party and held power since Turkey’s founding in 1923. 
However, that did not initiate a change in Turkey’s policy towards the US.277 In a 
message to President Bayar, Truman expressed his congratulations about Bayar’s victory 
and intimated that he looked forward to continued relations between the US and 
Turkey.278  
In a meeting with Ambassador Wadsworth and other American officials, the 
Turkish Foreign Minister Mehmet Fuat Köprülü stated, “We shall…continue our 
orientation to Western democracies. Our interests lie with yours.”279 The Turkish people 
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were very pleased with Turkey’s participation in the Korean War. They viewed the 
conflict as a fight against Communism and an opportunity to collaborate militarily with 
the United States. It was also an opportunity to show the strength of the Turkish armed 
forces. The Turkish Prime Minister stated that the “Korean war has opened new era, one 
in which we must strive harder and work faster towards common objectives.”280 
  
Shifting geopolitical landscape 
As 1951 began, the US predicted the USSR might extend its efforts to disrupt the 
Near East during the course of this year.281 This was due, in part, to the fact that the US 
had demonstrated involvement in Western Europe and Asia, so the Near East appeared to 
be of lesser American concern. The US also reiterated that military and economic aid 
extended to Greece and Turkey had remained consistent since 1947; and that as a result 
of that aid, Turkey had been able to build up its military, as shown by its performance in 
Korea.282 Turkey’s participation in the Korean War encouraged continued American aid 
and support for Turkey.  
As Turkey’s tensions with Bulgaria concerning the removal of Bulgar Turks 
continued, Turkey had expressed willingness to reopen the border after its closure in 
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October 1950. As of January 1951, the border had been open for a month and 18,847 
immigrants moved to Turkey from Bulgaria in that time frame.283 A population move of 
that magnitude led to increased economic difficulties for Turkey.  
As 1951 began, the US began to consider Yugoslavia in tandem with Greece and 
Turkey. All three shared geographic proximity and a reluctance to join the Soviet sphere, 
which made it feasible for the US to consider them together when developing policies for 
the region.284. The US determined that it could use 1951 to build up the military in 
Europe.285 As the US did not expect any military conflict with the USSR in Europe in 
1951, it intended to take the year to strengthen European military readiness to the furthest 
extent possible. However, if any European states could potentially be attacked by the 
USSR in 1951, it would be Greece and/or Yugoslavia, according to American 
strategists.286 US viewed it possible that the Soviets would attack Yugoslavia and 
encourage Greece and Turkey to not engage.287  
Turkey’s continued pursuit of NATO membership or a security arrangement with 
the US prompted Ambassador Erkin to propose American adherence to the British-
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French-Turkish Treaty of Mutual Assistance of 1939.288 As American participation in the 
pact would provide Turkey with the security guarantee it wanted, this suggestion could 
have provided an answer to Turkey’s concerns. However, the US continued to avoid any 
direct security guarantees outside of NATO.  
It became clear to the Americans that for the rest of the Middle East to remain 
stable, Middle Eastern defense would have to be strengthened and developed.289 In part, 
this came from the US wanting to make sure its aid to Greece, Turkey, and Iran was 
being utilized effectively. If the Middle East as a whole lost its stability, it would be very 
difficult for the other states to maintain their stability. The US also considered Turkey to 
be its strongest potential partner in the region and intended to utilize Turkey’s strength to 
help stabilize the region as a whole. The US realized that it had become a primary leader 
throughout the Middle East and considered it important to retain that position and not 
allow the UK to reassert its presence in the region.290 Prior to the 1950s, American 
involvement in the Middle East had been negligible. The Middle East was strategically 
important to both the West and the Soviet Union, as it had large amounts of oil, 
significant population sizes, and geographic significance. When the US realized it had the 
opportunity to be more of a leader in the region, it did not want to squander that 
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opportunity. With these factors in mind, the US asserted it should increase its efforts in 
Turkey.291 The US considered Turkey to be a European state as well as a Middle Eastern 
state, and therefore wanted Turkey to be involved in the defense of both areas.292  
After reconsidering the Turkish proposal to place mines in the Bosporus, the US 
navy emphatically supported the initiative and wanted Turkey to proceed, despite 
disagreement coming from the UK and a potential negative Soviet reaction.293  
 
Shift in American Policy 
In February of 1951, the Conference of Middle Eastern Chiefs of Mission294, 
organized 
and led by Ambassador McGhee, issued its agreed conclusions and recommendations. 
This Conference took place annually and included all American diplomats in the Middle 
East. The conference served to allow these diplomats to determine policy 
recommendations for the US State Department. The recommendations from the 1951 
conference advocated for an immediate invitation to join NATO for Turkey, for fear that 
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without this invitation, Turkey could become neutral.295 The members of this conference 
were influenced by additional information from US intelligence sources that clearly 
displayed the value Turkey presented to US interests and the dangers if Turkey should go 
neutral.  
 In the National Intelligence Estimate issued February 26, 1951, Turkey was 
portrayed as a staunch ally.296 The Estimate went into great detail about Turkey’s abilities 
and shortcomings. The economy was presented as a large problem, but it was consistently 
emphasized that despite the economy, Turkey would prove a formidable force in the 
event of a Soviet invasion.297 The estimate reiterated that Turkey was one of the most 
staunchly anti-Communist nations in existence, and that its alignment with the West was 
unlikely to be altered, unless war broke out. Then, without formal assurances that the US 
would come to its aid, a possibility of neutrality would present itself.298 This information 
changed the opinions of many involved in the conference, as it both painted Turkey as an 
ally of the United States and presented the inherent dangers to Western security should 
Turkey go neutral. Without Turkey, the Middle East stood a chance of being invaded by 
the Soviets. At this point in time, Turkey had significant military power. According to 
Ambassador McGhee, Turkey’s army was bigger than all other NATO members’ armies 
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at the time.299 This information played a significant role in altering the stances of the 
other regional ambassadors. The size and strength of the Turkish military would add 
significant security to NATO and would allow NATO the use of those resources in 
combatting Soviet aggression. Additionally, the geographic location would solidify the 
Eastern component of NATO, a prospect which was becoming more appealing as the 
Cold War raged on.300 Turkey’s admission would provide NATO with a remarkable 
extension of resources, the value of which was not underestimated. Not only did the 
appreciation for Turkey’s armed forces encourage the US to accept the idea of Turkey’s 
membership in NATO, it incentivized the US to advocate for Turkey’s membership on 
Turkey’s behalf.301 
Previously, potential Soviet retaliation had posed significant concerns for the 
United States. However, in 1951, intelligence sources indicated that the Soviet Union 
would be more amenable to Turkey’s membership in NATO than to other potential 
bilateral agreements.302 The United States realized that if membership in NATO proved 
unsuccessful, additional bilateral agreements between the US and Turkey would be 
necessary. The Soviet Union’s apparent opposition to bilateral agreements solidified the 
United States’ decision to advocate for Turkey’s membership. Turkey’s inclusion in 
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NATO should be based on Turkey’s potential contributions, not anticipated Soviet 
reactions, the US reasoned.303  
 
Balancing NATO and MEC 
 In addition to NATO, the US and the UK wanted to create a Middle East 
Command (MEC) that would utilize Turkey and other Middle Eastern nation states to 
help ensure the continued stability of the Middle East against Communism, although it 
never came to fruition. According to Churchill, the Turks would be more likely to 
participate in MEC if they were under Eisenhower’s command.304 The US deemed it 
necessary to move forward with preparations for MEC but could not do so until Greece 
and Turkey were admitted to NATO. The US especially needed Turkey in the MEC 
because it was the only Middle Eastern country that could contribute substantial armed 
forces.305 The UK agreed that Turkey should be included under Supreme Allied 
Commander of Europe (SACEUR) command.306 The US wanted to increase the depth of 
Turkish-American relations. Including Turkey in both NATO and the MEC provided 
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avenues for the US to work towards deepening ties with Turkey.307  The US and the UK 
wanted to prioritize the development of the MEC and were anxious to continue 
preparations.308 When talking with Ambassador McGhee about the general international 
situation, the Turkish Foreign Minister indicated that the US and Turkey required unity of 
action towards the USSR. There were areas in which both Europe and the Middle East 
had significant vulnerabilities, but if Turkey and the US collaborated, they could ensure 
greater stability throughout the region. Turkey’s invitation to join NATO solidified 
Turkish-American capabilities to act and react in tandem.309  
 The UK suggested Greece and Turkey should be included under NATO’s 
southern command. As the MEC continued to be discussed, the US viewed it as crucial 
that Turkey was included in all MEC conversations.310 Turkey had to be considered an 
equal partner to the US, UK, and France in MEC planning and implementation.311 The 
US agreed with the UK and wanted Greece and Turkey to be included under NATO’s 
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southern command.312 As it had been a long process for Greece and Turkey to be invited 
to join NATO, it was imperative that their membership not be contingent on participation 
in the MEC. Their accession into NATO also could not be delayed because the US and 
UK prioritized the MEC.313 Additionally, the NATO and MEC commands would have to 
remain separate. Any integration of the commands, especially in its initial iteration, 
would undermine the value of including Greece and Turkey in NATO.314 If the 
commands were integrated, it would appear as though Greece and Turkey had only been 
invited to join NATO so that they would agree to participate in the MEC. As both Greece 
and Turkey viewed participation in NATO as politically important, they would have 
taken offense to their inclusion being contingent on participation in the MEC.    
 
Turkish State of Affairs 
 Ambassador McGhee had an extensive discussion with President Bayar in 1952 
concerning Turkey’s development potential, Turkey’s role in the Middle East, and 
Turkey’s reaction to a potential Soviet invasion in the Middle East. Throughout the 
course of this conversation, Ambassador McGhee and President Bayar agreed that 
Turkey had substantial development potential, particularly in increasing agricultural 
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production.315 After the fall of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey’s foreign policy had been 
Western facing and had neglected relations with other Middle Eastern states.316 As 
Turkey had succeeded in its efforts to join NATO, McGhee thought it would be ideal for 
Turkey to revisit its policy towards Middle East states and potentially attempt to 
strengthen those relations. Regarding a potential Soviet attack on the Middle East, the 
Turkish perspective found it improbable that the Soviets would attempt to attack Iran or 
Iraq without also attacking Turkey, due to its proximity. As it would be difficult for the 
USSR to annihilate Turkey’s military, and because Turkey viewed its security as tied to 
security in the Middle East more broadly and, therefore, had a vested interest in 
defending the Middle East, it was deemed unlikely that the USSR would pursue this 
course of action. With Turkey’s newfound NATO membership, the US considered it even 
less likely the Soviets would attack the Middle East.317  
 In February 18, 1952, Turkey officially acceded to NATO. The accession took 
place at the North Atlantic Council meeting at Lisbon, where members of the Turkish 
government joined other governmental officials from all NATO member states for the 
accession and the rest of the summit.318 The Soviet Union consistently opposed NATO 
expansion, and Greece and Turkey’s accession to NATO was no different. However, the 
USSR did not have a concrete retaliation to this expansion, unlike its creation of the 
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Warsaw Pact after West Germany joined NATO in 1955.319 Turkey’s accession into 
NATO began a new era of Turkish-American relations, as Turkey’s NATO membership 
served as a confirmation of the US’s intention to keep Turkey out of the Soviet sphere. 
While Turkey’s NATO membership was a culmination of developments in Turkish-
American relations in the late 1940s and early 1950s, it functioned as an enhancement of 





























                                                     




 In the early days of Turkish-American relations, regional geopolitics played a 
significant role in the actions both parties took. It can be tempting to look at bilateral 
relations in a vacuum, neglecting external actors, particularly if those actors behave 
subtly. However, no international relations exist in a vacuum, and regional geopolitics 
continue to play a role in Turkish-American relations.  
 This paper concludes with Turkey’s accession into NATO, a policy decision that 
had consequences that are still in effect. Because of Article 5, Turkey and the US remain 
tied to one another, as well as to 28 other states, in defense. This paper seeks to show that 
this decision was not made lightly by either party. The US and Turkey engaged in many 
shared initiatives during the early Cold War years that played a significant role in shaping 
their relations. Turkey and the US became more integrated both economically and 
militarily through programs like the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. They shared 
concerns about the Soviet Union’s intentions to expand its sphere of influence, both 
regarding Turkey, and Eastern Europe more broadly. This encouraged the US and Turkey 
to further tighten their relations, resulting in Turkey’s participation in the Korean War 
and accession into NATO.  
 Diplomatic initiatives, however, were not the only driving factor in the 
development of Turkish-American relations. Particularly in the early Cold War years, the 
Soviet Union heavily influenced the actions of both Turkey and the US and drove the two 
states to enhance their alliance. Without the threat of Soviet expansion, and the shared 
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reluctance to allow the USSR to encroach upon Turkey, the Turkish-American alliance 
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